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THE MODERN IRONY OF CIVIL LAW: A MEMOIR OF
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
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GEORGE L. PRIEST*
Modern civil law faces an extraordinary irony. Today, in the United
States, civil law is in crisis. It is increasingly acknowledged that the crisis
stems from the expansion of civil liability since the mid-1960s following the
adoption in the U.S. of strict liability for product defects. The irony is that,
just at the time that the devastating implications of the strict liability
approach are becoming clear in the U.S., the European community has
decided to impose strict products liability upon its member states. l
As Europe expands standards of civil liability, the United States, in
response to the crisis, is engaged in massive retrenchment of civil liability.
Since 1985, the legislatures of 39 of the 50 states have enacted some version
of"tort reform" legislation.2 The most significant of these statutes is the 1987
New Jersey products liability act, which sharply halts the expansion of
manufacturer liability in a state which had inspired and had led the post-
1960s trend.3 Ofeven greater significance, within past months, the California
Supreme Court, which in 1963 first introduced the concept of strict products
John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, and Director, Program in Civil Liability,
Yale Law School. I am grateful to Robert Pushaw, whose parallel work on this sUbject
has been very helpful. I am also grateful to Daniel Friedmann and to participants at a
Symposium on Products Liability, Tel Aviv, Israel for comments and suggestions.
\. Directive ofthe Council of the European Communities (25 July 1985). Note that Israel
adopted strict products liability in 1980. Defective Products (Liability) Law 5740-1980,
SH. 5740,86; 34 L. S. I. 92. See generally, Daniel More, Products Liability: Israel(1987).
2. This legislation is reviewed in Priest, "The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law," 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Priest, Insurance Crisis].
3. New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 2A: 58C-1 et seq. (1987), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 108-119.
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liability,4 has itself recanted the strict liability approach. In Brown v. Superior
Court (Abbott Laboratories),5 the California Supreme Court concluded
that manufacturers of pharmaceuticals should be liable according to a
standard no more rigorous than negligence because of the disastrous effects
of strict products liability on the availability of drugs to consumers.
This paper explores the crisis in the United States, the relationship of the
crisis to the concept of strict products liability, and the modern U.S.
retrenchment. There are many implications of the U.S. experience for the
future of products liability law in Europe and in other nations, such as Israel,
that have adopted strict products liability.6 Part I describes the civil law
crisis in the United States. Part II reviews the history of strict products
liability to attempt to explain what it is about the doctrine that has caused
the crisis. It looks in particular at the original intent of the Founders ofstrict
products liability to show how strict liability has departed from the original
view in ways that have generated the current crisis in the U.S. Finally, Part
III describes in more detail the counterrevolution of U.S. law and its
implications for Europe and Israel.
I. The Current U.S. Crisis and Its Sources
In the United States, between the late months of 1984 and the early
months of 1987, reports began to accumulate of unusual changes in particular
commercial casualty insurance lines. Most prominent were announcements
of extraordinary increases in yearly insurance premiums, increases of 60 or
100 or, in some instances, 1500 percent. For a small number of entities -
daycare centers, some municipalities, nurse-midwives, as examples - insurers
refused to offer coverage at any premium. Where insurance remained
available, insurers drastically reduced the terms of basic insurance policy
coverage. Insurance deductibles were doubled (for example, for the
Kennestone Hospital, Marietta, Georgia, from $1 to $2 million?) and
4. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963). See also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
5. Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
6. Supra note I.
7. "Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled," Time, March 24, 1986 at 19.
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redoubled (for the City of Baton Rouge, from $100,000 to $500,0008). At the
same time, required coinsurance proportions were increased. Levels of
aggregate insurance coverage were lowered dramatically (for example, for
the City of Hartford, from $31 million to $4 million9). In addition, insurers
excluded new specific activities and liabilities from coverage altogether (for
example, pollution claims and employment discrimination claims from
municipality policies; 10 claims related to mergers and acquisitions from
Directors' and Officers' policies I I). In these same lines of commercial
coverage, insurers substituted a claims-made for an occurrence policy.12
These insurance changes generated, in turn, drastic responses from product
manufacturers and service providers. Prices were increased generally to
.offset increased premiums. Firms and entities denied insurance coverage
were forced to curtail operations. Jails were closed and police patrols
suspended until municipal mutual insurance programs were arranged. 13
Many cities and park authorities removed slides and swing sets from public
parks. 14 Schools removed diving boards from swimming pOOIS.15 A 1988
survey of manufacturers revealed that 47 percent had withdrawn products
from markets for liability reasons. 16
In the months since 1987, the crisis has appeared to subside. But the price
increases from liability insurance premiums remain largely intact. Those
products and services withdrawn from markets remain withdrawn. The 1988
survey of manufacturers also showed that 39 percent had decided against
introducing new products and 25 percent had discontinued new product
research. 17 Although many cities have been able to restore essential services
by forming mutual insurance groups, the mutual insurance form only
postpones the effects of increased liability, rather than curing them. 18
8. Bus. Ins., July 8, 1985 at I. In addition, the carrier increased the premium from $116,000
to $1.2 million for the same amount of coverage.
9. "Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled," supra note 7.
10. Bus. Ins., July I, 1985 at 12.
II. Wyatt Corp., 1985 Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Survey 21-24.
12. Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1985 at 33, col. 4.
13. "Sorry, Your Policy Is Cancelled," supra note 7 at 17-18; N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,1986, at
A26, col. I (editorial).
14. "Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled," supra note 7 at 24.
15. Governor's Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance, Insuring Our Future (New
York City Schools) (1986) 15,24 [hereinafter cited Cuomo Commission].
16. E. Patrick McGuire, The Impact ofProduct Liability at 20, Table 30 (Conf. Bd. 1988).
17. Ibid.
18. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 2 at 1578-82.
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These events represent a genuine crisis. The wholesale withdrawal of
products and the termination of product research certainly does not benefit
society. Moreover, the various insurance events are evidence of the
withdrawal of the insurance industry from the business of insurance. The
decline in insurance is obvious with respect to those lines for which
commercial coverage was refused altogether - such as midwife and daycare
coverage - as well as for those sets of.specific claims now excluded from
coverage - such as pollution claims against municipalities. The other
changes in insurance coverage, however, each add to the reduction in the
total financial resources available for insuring injuries: When deductibles
and coinsurance are increased and aggregate coverage ~educed, the insured
and the insured's potential victims bear more of the risk of future losses
themselves. Similarly, adoption of the claims-made policy cuts off coverage
of losses that occur during the policy period but become manifest only aft.::r
its expiration. The claims-made policy, thus, shifts the risks of latent injury
or disease to the insured and to the insured's victims.
No one can contest that reductions in i!lsurance coverage are harmful. All
humane societies want to maximize the availability of insurance, especially
for personal injury. Since 1984, however, the insurance capacity available to
V.S. citizens for injuries related to corporate activities has diminished
dramatically.
Very recently, several insurers and reinsurers have been brought into
court on government claims that various coverage changes violate the
antitrust laws (Senator Howard L. Metzenbaum has called it "the antitrust
conspiracy of the century"). The charges, however, are largely implausible: if
these various forms of insurance coverage could have been offered at a
profit, then their withdrawal would have reduced insurer profit
opportunities, hardly the ambition of a profit-maximizing cartel. On the
other hand, if these forms of coverage could not have been offered at a profit,
then their withdrawal is no different than the more widespread withdrawals
of products and services made unprofitable by expanding liability.
There are very strong reasons to believe that the expansion in civil liability
in the V nited States has been the source of the crisis. First, the manufacturing
and service industries most seriously affected by the changes in insurance
coverage are exactly those that have been most seriously affected by changes
in tort liability. Since the adoption of strict products liability in 1963, tort
liability has been expanded generally with respect to manufacturing and
service industries, both by the extension of affirmative duties and the
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restriction of available defenses. 19 This expansion of liability has created
long tails ofliability exposure for corporate defendants that they never faced
in earlier years.
There is a second important reason, however, to attribute the crisis to the
expansion of liability, rather than to more particular characteristics of the
commercial insurance industry. In the United States, large numbers of
entities, including manufacturers and governmental bodies, do not purchase
commercial liability insurance, but instead self-insure. In 1985, these entities
suffered the same problems as the commercially insured. The self-insured
City of New York, for example, removed diving boards froin public schools.2o
Self-insured manufacturers increased product prices because of higher
liability exposures. A more particular survey of Fortune 500 manufacturers,
those whose size and self-insurance capacity make them least vulnerable to
vagaries of commercial insurance markets, showed that 25 percent had
removed products from markets for liability reasons.21
There is an important question, however, as to what it is about the
expansion of liability pursuant to the adoption of strict products liability
that has generated a crisis. Indeed, the diagnosis of the source of the crisis is
crucial, both to efforts to improve the law in the United States and to the
impending elaboration of the strict products liability principle in Europe
and in Israel.
The next Part addresses that question by returning to the history of the
adoption of strict products liability in the United States to examine what the
Founders of strict liability intended to achieve and how the subsequent
development of strict liability has deviated from those intentions.
II. Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent
The development of tort law in the United States since the mid-1960s
raises a mystery. There is little doubt that since the 1960s a revolution in tort
law has occurred. A simple comparison of tort law decisions today and tort
19. See generally, Priest, "The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law," 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1986) [hereinafter
cited as Priest, Invention].
20. Cuomo Commission at 15,24.
21. N. Weber, Product Liability: The Corporate Response (Conf. Bd. 1987) 4-7.
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law decisions 25 years ago confirms the revolution. 22 What remains
mysterious, however, is the means by which this revolution occurred. The
source of the revolution is very clearly tied to the adoption of strict products
liability in Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (Second) by the
American Law Institute (ALI) in 1963, and its subsequent acceptance by
virtually all of the individual state supreme courts. Puzzling, however, is that
a revolution in law would be introduced by the very conservative American
Law Institute and then implemented by a set of supreme court justices who
were probably the most conservative members of the legal communityofthe
time. There is little return to revolution for members of the judiciary.
Moreover, law-making by the American Law Institute, as the term for its
projects - "Restatement" - suggests, has seldom aspired to the radical
overturn of civil jurisprudence.
This Part attempts to resolve the puzzle. It attempts to describe how the
adoption of Section 402A simultaneously could be consistent with the
conservatism both of the American Law Institute and the American state
judiciary, and yet set the stage for the radical revolution in tort law that
followed. It argues that the Founders of Section 402A did not fully appreciate
the distinction that has become the centerpiece of modern products liability
law between manufacturing defects, design defects, and defective warnings.
Section 402A was to represent only a limited change in the law because the
Founders intended its strict liability standard, with minor exceptions, to
apply only to what we now call manufacturing defect cases.
In this view, the vast expansion of modern law occurred as courts went
beyond Section 402A to apply strict products liability concepts to design and
warning defect cases in the years following 1965. Since the Founders had not
anticipated these applications, the interpretive guideposts in Section 402A's
Comments proved, in many instances, unhelpful and in important other
instances, misleading. These Comments contributed substantially to the
expansion of liability, but in a way largely unintended by the Founders.
Indeed, the vast expansion of modern tort law since 1965 based upon
Section 402A is, at heart, inconsistent with the intent of its Founders. It is
this inconsistency that has generated the current U.S. crisis.
22. See, for example, Priest, "Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate," in Liability
Perspectives and Policy (1988) at 184 for a comparison of pre-and post-revolution case
law.
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A. Product Defect lAw in the 1950s and Why the Founders Objected to It
Section 402A was designed to correct deficiencies in the rights of action
available to consumers suffering personal injury as a consequence ofdefective
products. Prior to 1965, 'consumer rights of recovery were defined by
warranty law and, to a substantially lesser extent, by negligence law. There
were significant differences in rights of recovery across the jurisdictions. In
all jurisdictions, however, a consumer could recover if in privity of contract
and if the injury could be attributed to a breach of an express warranty or of
the implied warranty of merchantability.23
Typically, these legal requirements limited injured consumers to suits
against retailers under the implied warranty of merchantability. Consumer
suits against manufacturers were constrained either because the consumer
was not in privity with the manufacturer or because the manufacturer's
express warrarity (the existence of which was typically sufficient to create
privity) explicitly excluded coverage of consequential personal injury
damages. The privity requirement was easily satisfied in suits against retailers,
but, of course, only by those injured consumers who had actually purchased
the product. Retailers, however, seldom extend express warranties. Thus,
against retailers, it was typically necessary for consumers to invoke the
implied warranty of merchantability. The implied warranty allowed
recovery, quite routinely, because a product causing personal injury was
easily seen to violate the requirement that it be "fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used. ''24
Even when these legal requirements were satisfied, however, it was
necessary for the consumer to have given notice to the seller of the breach of
contract within a reasonable time and to have carefully elected among
available contract remedies. Generally, any complaint to the seller would
satisfy the notice requirement, although many courts refused to regard a
lawsuit as adequate notice; that is, it was necessary for the consumer to have
made some intermediate communication with the defendant-seller prior to
suit.25 In addition, to recover damages for personal injury, the plaintiff-
consumer must have complied with Section 69 of the Uniform Sales Act
requiring election of remedies. Section 69 was designed to prevent duplicative
23. Uniform Sales Act, Sections 12, IS.
24. Uniform Sales Act, Section 15(2).
25. This requirement was retained in the .Uniform Commercial Code and only relaxed by
judicial decision in the inid- I970s.
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recoveries in more complex contractual contexts. It was drafted to require
complainants to elect from among remedies that rescinded the contract,
returning the victim to the position occupied prior to the contract; remedies
that affirmed the contract, seeking specific performance; or remedies that
affirmed the contract, seeking damages for unfulfilled performance. Thus,
Section 69 limited a consumer to either return of the product price (rescission
of the contract), replacement ofthe product (specific contract performance),
or consequential damages for contract breach. 26 As a consequence, in
concept, if the injured consumer upon complaint had been given money
back or had been given a new, non-damaged model of the product, or was
found to have "elected" either of these remedies in the initial complaint, he or
she was barred from any recovery for personal injury regardless of
seriousness of injury.
These legal provisions defined the easy cases for consumer recovery.
There were other grounds that could be pursued where warranty law was
unavailable. Many jurisdictions, for example, allowed recovery in contract
law against manufacturers based upon representations in manufacturer
product advertisements.27 Here, again, the notice and election requirements
needed to be satisfied. Moreover, there remained substantial difficulties in
obtaining a recovery on this legal theory because it was necessary for
consumers to prove that they had relied on the advertisement for the product
purchase and because the typical manufacturer advertisement was seldom
more specific than the assurance presumed by the implied warranty of
merchantability.28
Many other jurisdictions also allowed consumer recovery against
manufacturers on negligence grounds. The negligence theory was not
generally available because of the privity of contract bar. Many jurisdictions
permitted negligence actions despite the absence of privity, however, in
specific types of cases, most commonly where the product could be defined
as "imminently dangerous, ''29 or in cases involving spoiled foodstuffs. Some
courts had extended the foodstuff exception to products loosely described as
"products for intimate bodily use." In fact, this description was contrived by
26. Of course, unless such damages were excluded by warranty.
27. See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1932); reh. den., 15 P. 2d
1118 (1932).
28. Baxter, ibid., for example, was an exception because the advertisement specifically stated
that an automobile windshield glass, whicll subsequently shattered, was shatterproof.
29. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050 (Ct. App. 1916).
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academics pressing for the extension of the rule. 3o The actual case law was a
hodge-podge of idiosyncratic exeptions for hair-dyes, scalp treatments, skin
formulas and the like, and some pharmaceuticals. 31 "Intimate bodily use"
was a plausible fact-based link among these cases and, of course, was
suggestive of the food cases in which bodily intimacy was a literal description
of the problem. Some courts also had extended negligence liability through
expansion of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,32 although there remained
substantial evidentiary limitations to consumer success employing res ipsa.
The simple desire of the Founders was to ease consumer recovery in cases
of personal injury suffered from products which obviously had been
mismanufactured. The concern of the important figures in the Restatement
process - Prosser, Page Keeton, Malone, Noel, and some others - was a
set of cases, not insignificant in number, in which consumers deserved
automatic recovery for personal injury. For these cases, the warranty defenses
of privity, notice, and election of remedies, as well as the reliance requirement
for the advertising theory and the various limitations on negligence recovery,
were all inapposite and counterproductive.
The cases for which the Founders believed consumers deserved automatic
recovery are what we now call manufacturing or production defect cases in
which the injury to the consumer was caused by a deviation from the
manufacturer's own standards of production or quality control. We shall see
in a moment that the Restatement and its Comments make sole reference to
manufacturing defect cases. But there is abundant evidence of the Founders'
focus on manufacturing defects both in their contemporaneous writings
explicating and justifying Section 402A and in their writings of the preceding
decade as they argued that the limited treatment of manufacturing defect
cases by warranty and negligence law needed to be changed.
The history of the progression of successive drafts of Section 402A through
the Restatement process is well-known. 33 The drafts attached strict liability34
to, respectively, "food for human consumption" (1961 draft); "food for
30. See William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts. 1941, 1955 editions.
31. For a review of the case law, see Priest, Invention, supra note 19.
32. See California, in particular, reviewed in Harry Kalven, Jr., "Torts: The Quest for
Appropriate Standards," 53 Calif. L. Rev. 189 (1965).
33. See Priest, Invention; Herbert W. Titus, "Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A
and the Uniform Commercial Code," 22 Stan. L. Rev. 713,756 (1970).
34. Liability though "the seller has exercised all possible care." See Tent. Drafts No.6 (1961);
No.7 (1962); and No. 10 (1964).
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human consumption or other products for intimate bodily use" (1962 draft);
and "any product" (1964, final draft); where such products are both "defective
and unreasonably dangerous. "35 The task of the Founders was to explain
why application of the strict liability standard turned on the defective
character of the product36 and what the term "defect" was to mean.
Prosser's important article "Assault upon the Citadel" in 1960 presented
the outline of the approach. 37 According to Prosser, the defect requirement
simply introduced into law what had become the factual prerequisite for all
negligence trials involving product injuries. In a negligence trial, Prosser
asserted, the plaintiff must prove two points: first, "that his injury has been
caused by a defect in the product"; second, "that the defect existed when the
product left the hands of the defendant. "38 The strict liability standard that
Prosser was proposing only acknowledged more explicitly what was a reality
at trial. As a consequence, Prosser believed, the standard of strict liability for
product defects introduced very little change in the law. Indeed, Prosser
claimed that strict defect liability was essentially the equivalent of negligence:
"an honest estimate might very well be that there is not one case in a hundred
in which strict liability would result in recovery where negligence does
not. "39 As we shall see, the principal difference Prosser sought to achieve
through strict liability was the defeat of the various warranty defenses
described above.
Throughout his writings, Prosser simply presumed that the definition of
"defect" was uncontroversial; he never discussed the concept at any length.40
His subordinates, however, thought it necessary to explicate the concept.
Page Keeton, in a series of overlapping articles written during the progression
of Restatement drafts, explained what the defect requirement was meant to
achieve. According to Keeton,41 there are fundamentally two types ofproduct
35. See sources cited supra note 33.
36. As we shall see, and as is well-known, the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement was
meant to limit the extent of strict liability.
37. William L. Prosser, "The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),"
69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
38 Ibid. at 1114.
39. Ibid.
40. But see text accompanying notes 78-80, infra, where Prosser's interpretation of"defect"
can be inferred from the examples that he chose in the Comments to Section 402A.
41. Keeton's most extensive substantive discussion of the defect requirement appeared in
1963: Page Keeton, "Products Liability - Liability Without Fault and the Requirement
of a Defect," 41 Tex. L.Rev. 855 (1963), following two earlier articles, the first praising
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defects. The first is where the plaintiff's injury results from an "ingredient or
condition of the product" of which the manufacturer was unaware at the
time of sale. "In this situation, the product was different from products of
like kind. There was a miscarriage in the manufacturing process or something
deleterious in the product" (citing spoiled foodstuff cases). 42 Defects of this
nature, of course, are now known as manufacturing defects.
The second fundamental category, according to Keeton, consists ofdefects
which the manufacturer knows about at the time of sale. Keeton, however, is
not referring to what we now call design defects. Keeton describes cigarettes
or cosmetics or pharmaceuticals as examples of this second category -
products known to contain ingredients that will harm some set of consumers,
but whose harmful ingredients cannot be eliminated. Here Keeton is referring
to what have come to be known as unavoidably unsafe products. Keeton
presents as examples, drugs or cosmetics that are safe and effective for most
users, but harmful to some small set with allergies or particular sensitivities
to some of the product's ingredients.43
According to Keeton, strict liability is only appropriate for the first
category of defects (manufacturing defects).44 Keeton's discussion of the
second defect category (unavoidably unsafe products) consists of a review of
the cigarette litigation showing that there had been no cases in which
cigarette manufacturers had been held liable - to him, for good reason: the
risks of cigarette use were as well-known to the user as to the manufacturer.
Keeton does cite some cosmetic cases in which manufacturers had been held
liable for allergic reactions, but only where "an appreciable number," as
opposed to a small minority, ofconsumers had suffered the reaction.45 Cases
involving defects of this nature, Keeton concludes, must be governed by a
negligence or fault standard. The number of individuals affected was a
measure of the manufacturer's fault. The issue in such cases was whether the
number of individuals adversely affected by the product was sufficient to
the expansion ofthe implied warranties: "Products Liability - Current Developments,"
40 Tex. L. Rev. 193 (1961); the second, urging the shift from proof of negligence to the
simpler proofofdefect: "Products Liability - Proof ofthe Manufacturer's Negligence,"
49 Virgo L. Rev. 666 (1963).
42. Keeton, "Products Liability - Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect," ibid. at 859.
43. Ibid. at 859-72.
44. Ibid. at 859-63.
45. Ibid. at 863-72.
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regard the product as "unreasonably dangerous," the second of Section
402A's requirements.46
Of the Advisers of the Restatement project, Keeton's was the most explicit
discussion of Section 402A's defect requirement. It is very clear from his
approach that the Founders' conception of the defect standard was far
different than that prevailing today. At that time there was no thought of
strict liability for design defects. Indeed, Keeton in 1963 did not recognize
design defects as a separate defect category.
This should not suggest that the problem of design-related product injuries
was unknown to scholars of the time. Rather, from my research, it was the
unanimous view that design problems should be governed by the negligence
standard. Fleming James' 1955 survey of products liability, though
tentatively suggesting movement toward strict liability, discussed design
questions solely in terms of negligence. 47 More significantly, Dix Noel, who
concentrated his work in the field on the design problem, wrote three articles
between 1962 and 1966 on product design and in each presumed that the
negligence standard was the most appropriate way ofconsidering the design
Issue.
Noel's 1962 article in the Yale Law Journal was published at the midpoint
of the Restatement process. 48 Noel distinguishes four types of design failures
that could lead to consumer injury: concealed dangers (giving as an example,
an aluminum lounge chair with a hinge that amputates a consumer's finger);
the failure to provide available safety devices; defective composition, for
example in the choice of materials for an alloy; and, later, failure to provide
adequate warnings or instructions.49 According to Noel, the legal question
appropriate for each of these design categories is whether the design made
the product unreasonably dangerous. The court must look to the knowledge
of the manufacturer at the time ofproduction, the alternative design methods
available, and the quantum of danger, all considerations traditional to
negligence.
At the end of the article, Noel reviews the potential application to design
cases of Section 402A's strict liability standard - then proposed only for
46. Ibid. at 870.
47. Fleming James, Jr., "Products Liability," 34 Tex. L. Rev. 44, 192 (1955). Compare,
especially, pages 50-55 and 66-68.
48. Dix W. Noel, "Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product,"
71 Yale L.J. 816 (1962).
49. Ibid.
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defectively prepared food. 50 What he sees are largely problems. He
sarcastically asks whether the strict liability standard could be invoked
against cigarette manufacturers for defective cigarette design. The tone of
the rhetorical question is so incredulous that the question is not worth an
answer. 51 He then puts an example of an airplane, designed by the best
experts available, that after deployment develops unsuspected tensions which
cause a wing to be torn off. He presumes that a simplistic reading of the
Restatement's strict liability standard could regard the plane's design as
defective and unreasonably dangerous. But, again, he is incredulous of the
result, arguing "it is not clear that passengers in such a plane... should
reasonably expect that it will be free even from flaws not yet discovered by
any of the leading experts in the field. "52 Noel questions whether strict
liability is a useful way of resolving design defect cases, concluding that
negligence principles including contributory negligence - though at odds
with the strict liability approach - must continue to be dominant.53
Despite the extension in fact of strict liability in succeeding years - to
products for intimate bodily use and then to all products - Noel continued
to insist on negligence as the standard appropriate for design-related injuries.
In a 1965 article in an important Southwestern Law Journal symposium on
products liability, Noel again describes strict liability as applicable solely to
manufacturing defect cases.54 Even later in 1966, after the successful adoption
of Section 402A, Noel again presumes the negligence standard controls
design problems.55
Noel's presumption that strict liability applies only to manufacturing
defects and not to design-related defects was not unique. Each of the central
50. Ibid. at 877.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. Noel adds offhandedly that "perhaps liability in this situation would be a useful
means of spreading the loss." But Noel doubts the utility of even the loss-spreading
policy: "that holding might unduly discourage the development of useful new products."
Ibid.
53. Ibid. at 877-78. There is a hint in Noel's article of criticism ofstrict liability on any terms
and resentment of the Restatement group. Noel was not an Adviser to the Restatement
on Section 402A.
54. Dix W. Noel, "Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instruction or
Warnings," 19 Southwestern L.J. 43,44 (1964). Note that this is the same Symposium at
which Wade, also concluding that strict liability applies only to manufacturing defects,
presents his first articulation of the risk-utility test appropriate for design defects. See
infra, text accompanying notes 91-95.
55. Dix W. Noel, "Manufacturers' Liability for Negligence," 33 Tenn. L. Rev. 444 (1966).
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figures of the Restatement project seems to have shared this view. John
Wade, for example, whose work in later years would become influential in
the design defect field, at the origin of Section 402A defined "defect" as
manufacturing defect. In the 1965 Southwestern symposium, whose papers
were presented just prior to the ALI's final adoption of Section 402A, Wade
describes the defect requirement in terms identical to those of Page Keeton,
discussed above. 56 A defect under Section 402A, according to Wade, is "a
mistake in the manufacturing process, for example, the product was
adulterated or one of its parts was broken or weakened or not properly
attached... "57 Strict liability can be defended, Wade argues, because for
products of this nature, "there is no need of proving fault in [the
manufacturer's] letting it come to be in that condition. "58
Like Keeton, Wade believes that more difficult problems arise where the
product does not deviate from the manufacturer's specifications or quality
standards, but still proves to be dangerous - that is, where the product is
unavoidably dangerous or incorporates a dangerous design. Again, to Wade,
the question in these cases is whether the product is "unreasonably"
dangerous. Wade concedes that the term "defect" could be defined to
embrace such cases. 59 But he claims that the effort to do so is likely to prove
misleading.60 The issue according to Wade is centrally one of the
manufacturer's conduct: did the manufacturer act reasonably in putting the
product on the market? "This, it would seem, is another way of posing the
question of whether the product is reasonably safe or not. And it may well be
the most useful way of presenting it. "61 Wade directly responds to the
allegation that strict liability in cases of this nature has no meaning
independent of negligence. "It may be argued that this is simply a test of
negligence. Exactly. "62
Roger Traynor also shared the view that strict liability in Section 402A
was only applicable to manufacturing defects. Traynor's opinion on this
issue has been misunderstood, in part because the first legitimate strict
liability case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. 63 would be classified
56. John W. Wade, "Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers," 19 Southwestern L.J. 5 (1965).
57. Ibid. at 14.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. at 15 and at n. 53.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid. at 15.
62. Ibid. at 15.
63. Supra note 4.
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today as a design defect case and, in part, because Traynor was one of the
first to seriously consider the difficult questions involved in extending strict
liability to design defect cases, as I shall discuss below. But there is no doubt
that Traynor was thinking of manufacturing defect cases when he articulated
the strict liability approach. In his famous 1965 article, "The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products in Strict Liability,"64 Traynor defines a
"defective product" as one which fails to match average product quality or
one which deviates from the product norm.65
It is clear that Traynor has manufacturing defects in mind here. Traynor
continues in the article to discuss problems with the "deviation from the
norm" standard. What are the problems? According to Traynor, the
deviation from the norm standard is overly inclusive; it goes too far. 66 Again,
as with Keeton and Wade, Traynor is concerned that the defect rule might be
\
applied to unavoidably unsafe products, such as blood or pharmaceuticals.
Traynor does not suggest how he would approach such products: his article
was meant to be provoking; he presents a series of difficult problems, but
provides no answers to them. (Of course, he was a sitting judge at the time.)
But it is clear that he does not regard simple strict liability for defective
products an an answer. Strict liability is an answer only to the less complex
question raised by manufacturing defects. And interestingly, Traynor
describes Greenman as a manufacturing defect case.67
In retrospect, the Founders' commitment to strict liability for only
manufacturing and not for design defect cases should not be surprising.
Recall the importance to the Founders ofthe food cases as precedents for the
application of strict liability. The food cases, of course, are quintessential
examples of manufacturing defect cases. The issue in the food cases is
whether there is some unexpected and harmful ingredient that was mistakenly
introduced into the food product or whether the processor's quality control
efforts failed to detect spoilage. There is never an issue of defective recipe.
Strict liability for food cases has nothing to do with design.
64. Roger J. Traynor, "The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products in Strict Liability," 32
Tenn. L. Rev. 363 (1965).
65. Ibid. at 367.
66. Ibid. at 367-68.
67. Ibid. at 367. Note that Traynor's description of Greenman has been ignored in the
expansion of strict liability. Greenman itself refers to the application of strict liability for
defects "in manufacture or design." 377 P. 2d 897, 898 (1963). Even Traynor did not
address this discrepancy in description, again in my view, because none of the Founders
at the time had focussed clearly on design problems as "defects."
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If the ambition of the Founders was no more than strict liability for
manufacturing defects, it becomes easier to see the nature ofthe Founders'
objections to existing warranty and negligence law. It is also easier to
comprehend why the Founders thought it was perfectly appropriate to
accomplish the change in the law by the Restatement process, rather than
through more comprehensive and democratically legitimate legislation.
The Founders objected to the warranty and tort law limitations on
consumer recoveries because, in the context of manufacturing defect cases,
each of the limitations seemed to operate as a legal technicality, without
purpose and indifferent to the underlying merits of the claim. The arguments
raised here are now familiar. Where a product because of mismanufacture
has injured someone, why should it matter whether the injured person had or
had not personally paid the money for the product to become in privity of
contract with the seller?68 As long as statutes oflimitations had not run, why
should it matter whether the consumer had delivered some intermediate
notice ofbreach?69 The potential injustice from the operation ofthe election
of remedies section was obvious. The most telling example was one in which
the consumer had received in reimbursement a new product or return of the
purchase price, but had suffered serious personal injury and was barred from
recovery by the election requirement.
The limitations on the other grounds of recovery were no better. Again,
where a manufacturing defect had injured a consumer, why should the
victim be forced to parse the manufacturer's advertising copy and, in
addition, prove that he or she had specifically relied on the advertisement in
purchasing the product?70 Similarly, why distinguish between "imminently
dangerous" products and others, where the product deviated from the
manufacturer's own standards?71
Where the source of the injury is a deviation from the manufacturer's own
manufacturing and design standards, the various limitations on consumer
recovery are very difficult to defend. They operate solely as legal
technicalities, defeating the just expectations of every party to the
transaction. If the manufacturer itself must concede that the product was
defective and caused injury, how can one justify invocation of the privity
68. James, "Products Liability," 34 Tex. L. Rev. 192, 193 (1955).
69. Ibid. at 206.
70. Ibid. at 196.
71. Ibid. at 227.
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defense, or the notice of breach defense, or the election of remedies defense?
Why should only manufacturers of foodstuffs and hair-dyes bear special
responsibilities?72
The various defenses can be easily justified in other contract and tort
contexts. In the context of manufacturing defects, however, these defenses
cannot be justified by even the most basic concepts of contract and tort law.
The privity of contract rule, for example, makes good sense in contexts
involving explicit negotiation over contractual responsibilities at the various
stages of transfer from manufacture to sale of the finished product.73 But
there is surely no explicit negotiation in the context of the typical consumer
purchase.74 Similarly, the requirement that the complaining party notify of a
claim of contract breach is a useful rule both in contexts of continuing
contractual performance over time and where it is possible for the performing
party to mitigate loss from the breach by cure or otherwise. But, again,
where a consumer suffers personal injury from a manufacturing defect, the
independent notice requirement has no function whatsoever. The advertising
reliance requirement and the various limitations of negligence recovery
make just as little sense for manufacturing defect cases.
It should be emphasized that these objections to the various defenses of
consumer recovery were not at the time related to concerns about the
empirical dimension of the problem. The election requirement of Section 69,
for example, may have influenced pleadings, but there was never an empirical
demonstration that the Section had been strictly interpreted to substantially
defeat consumer recoveries. Similarly, the notice requirement seems
egregious on paper in manufacturing defect cases. But it is difficult to find
cases in which it was actually invoked to prevent consumer recovery. The
reliance requirement regarding advertising and the various limitations on
negligence recovery were, perhaps, more significant. But none of the
Founders ever believed that the problem of consumer product injuries was a
significant one for society. In contrast to automobile or workplace injuries,
72. See Fleming James, Jr., "General Products - Should Manufacturers be Liable without
Negligence?" 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923 (1957).
73. Winterbottom v. Wright is a perfect example: the legal obligations ofthe postmaster, the
employee and the manufacturer had all been negotiated separately. For a further
discussion, see Epstein, "Products Liability as an Insurance Market," 14 J. Legal Studies
645 (1984).
74. This, of course, was the point made vividly (in my view, too vividly) in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors. Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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consumer product-related injuries represented a relatively minor field.
Correcting and revising the law for the field constituted a technical
improvement in the law, rather than an important advance in social justice.
The intent of the Founders, thus, was largely to clean up an area of law
where the more general rules of contract and tort did not quite fit. Changing
the grounds for recovery for injuries caused by manufacturing defects was a
reform that could command - as it did - widespread support. The reform
generated little objection and no principled objection.75 Indeed, because the
Restatement project sought no more than to correct a set of technical flaws
in the law, it could be implemented directly by lawyers. There was no need to
consult with the interest groups affected,76 whether manufacturers or
consumers, or to seek legislative authorization for the change.
B. What the Founders Achieved: Section 402A and its Comments
Section 402A and its Comments make very clear that the strict liability
standard was to apply chiefly to manufacturing defects. 77 The text of the
Comments strongly supports that interpretation. More significantly, in the
many illustrations of how strict liability was to be applied, there is not a
single clear example of application of strict liability to design defects. There
are many additional passages which, concededly, are susceptible to more
expansive interpretations of strict liability. Indeed, it is the open-ended
character of these passages that has led to the vast expansion of modern law.
Section 402A attaches strict liability to anyone who sells a product "in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to user or consumer. The
operative definitions of the "defective condition" and "unreasonably
dangerous" requirements in the Comments mirror the analysis of the
scholarly writings of Prosser, Keeton and Wade, described above.
The concept "defective condition"is defined in Comment g affirmatively,
and in Comment h negatively. Comment g provides that a "defective
condition" is one "not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him." This definition is not sufficiently specific
75. Manufacturing interests never seriously objected to the change in the law.
76. At the 1962 Meetings of the American Law Institute, the members entertained a statement
by the pharmaceutical industry regarding strict liability for drugs, but without serious
discussion. There were no industry presentations the next year when the Institute
considered extending the strict liability standard to all products.
77. The Comments also refer tangentially to a manufacturer's obligation to provide warnings.
See infra, text accompanying notes 86-87.
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to distinguish between manufacturing and design defects, a vagueness of
substantial subsequent importance, as we shall see below.78 Comment h
provides that a "product is not in defective condition when it is safe for
normal handling and consumption," again ambiguous as between
manufacturing and design defects. .
A fuller description in Comment h, however, provides more detail as to
the meaning of defective condition. According to Comment h, the defective
condition of a product "may arise not only from harmful ingredients, not
characteristic of the product itself, either as to presence or quantity, but also
from foreign objects contained in the product, from decay or deterioration
before sale, or from the way the product is prepared or packed." The
reference to the "quantity" of an ingredient may possibly be interpreted to
incorporate a product whose design is defective because of excessive
ingredient levels. Other than this vague reference, however, the description
can only be read to refer to manufacturing defects.
The unreasonably dangerous standard is defined in Comment i. The
Comment makes quite clear - as is well-known - that the unreasonably
dangerous requirement was meant to serve as a limitation on liability when a
product might cause harm, but the consumer was fully aware of the product's
harm-causing potential, such as in the familiar cases of tobacco and alcohol.
The conceptual basis for the Comment was the distinction between
manufacturing defects and unavoidably dangerous products,· discussed
extensively by Keeton and Wade, as described above. 79 The Comment,
following Keeton and Wade, states directly that strict liability was not meant
to apply to this category of defects.
The remainder of the Comments consist of elaborations of the history of
strict liability, its scope in terms of potential defendants and plaintiffs,
defenses, extensions and limitations. None of the other Comments directly
addresses the defect requirement. But the Comments together provide the
strongest evidence of the exclusive focus of the Founders on strict liability
for manufacturIng defects. The Comments present 54 separate examples (or
sets of examples) of the types of cases to which the strict liability standard
was meant to apply. Six of the 54 examples are unclear as to the character of
the defect, most commonly because the example's point is to illustrate that
the scope of strict liability extends both to users and bystanders and against
78. See infra, text accompanying notes 96-97.
79. See supra, text accompanying notes 41-46.
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all levels of sellers. Of the remaining 48 examples, 11 illustrate unavoidably
unsafe products, exempted from strict liability. Thirty-seven examples
remain: five represent exceptions which prove that strict liability applies to
manufacturing defects; and the remaining 32 are each applications of strict
liability in manufacturing defect contexts. The strongest evidence that the
Founders focussed exclusively on strict liability for manufacturing defects is
that they did not present a single example in the Comments of an alternative
strict liability application.80
The unanimity of approach of the examples demonstrates again the
narrow focus of the Founders. It is clear that the Founders chiefly intended
strict liability to apply to manufacturing defect cases. This implication is
only bolstered by an earlier finding that the 40 cases that Prosser cited in the
Appendix to Section 402A to support his claim that the various state courts
were increasingly adopting strict liability were themselves each manufacturing
defects cases. 81 The novelty of the cases to Prosser was, most frequently,
their relaxation of the privity of contract rule.
The Comments to Section 402A assume a new meaning when read from
the manufacturing defect prospect. Comment n, addressing contributory
negligence, for example, has always been difficult to understand and justify.
Comment n provides that, since the liability of Section 402A is not based
upon a seller's negligence, the consumer's contributory negligence will not
generally be relevant.
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the
other hand, the form of contributory negligence which consists in
voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is
a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the
user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and
nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
80. I discuss the Founders' approach toward warnings, infra text accompanying notes
86-87.
81. Priest, Invention, supra note 19 at 514-516. I now include Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., given my new reading of Justice Traynor's interpretation of the case. See
supra, text accompanying note 67.
HeinOnline -- 9 Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 113 1989
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE U.S. 113
The denial of traditional contributory negligence in Comment n has had
two principal effects. First, it has inspired subsequent judicial efforts to
define a legal regime for strict liability that is distinctively different than the
negligence regime.82 Secondly, it has supported specific judicial rulings
denying the relevan.ce of consumer contributory actions in a wide range of
products liability contexts.83
The denial of contributory negligence is peculiar, however, because the
strongest modern defense of strict liability has insisted on the vitality of the
contributory negligence defense. In recent years, a group of lawyer-
economists, led by Professors Shavell and Landes and Judge Posner, have
trumpeted the economic efficiency of modern strict liability.84 The efficiency
claim, however, requires not only that contributory negligence be an available
defense, but more centrally, that the consumer's contributory negligence be
the effective basis for determining liability.85
Comment n's approach to contributory negligence, however, becomes
plausible once it is recalled that the Founders had meant strict liability
chiefly to apply to manufacturing defect cases. In the context of a
manufacturing defect, the ability of the consumer to contribute to the
occurrence of the injury is very constrained. If the consumer is unaware of
the defect inherent in the product, there is no range for contributory
negligence. As directed by the Comment, only where the consumer has
become aware ofthe defect, yet voluntarily proceeds to use the product, does
the concept of contributory negligence have a place. As long as strict liability
is applied only in manufacturing defect contexts, the denial of contributory
negligence makes perfect sense, including perfect economic sense.
Section 402A's Comment j dealing with warnings and instructions has
also seemed peculiar. Comment j provides that, in some cases, sellers can be
required to give warnings or instructions as to product use. Comment j has
82. I discuss and criticize this different regime in Priest, "Products Liability Law and the
Accident Rate," supra note 22 at 184 and Priest, "Modern Tort Law and Its Reform," 22
Valparaiso University L R. I (1987).
83. See, e.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136,501 P.2d 1163 (1972) and McCown v. Int'l.
Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13,342 A.2d 381 (1975) (both holding that contributory negligence
is not an available defense in strict liability actions).
84. Steven Shavell, "Strict Liability versus Negligence," 9 J. Legal Stud. I (1980). Landes &
Posner, "A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability," 14 J. Legal Stud. 535
(1985).
85. See discussion of this point in Priest, "Products Liability Law and its Effect on the
Accident Rate," supra note 22.
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been the source of the extraordinary explosion of defective warning law in
the years following Section 402A's adoption.86 Yet the illustrations to
Comment j all are examples of Keeton's and Wade's second category of
defects, unavoidably dangerous products, such as products to which some
set of consumers is allergic or drugs for which some set of consumers is
particularly susceptible.
Viewed from the perspective of the Keeton and Wade writings on this
subject, Comment j represented a small step toward addressing consumer
losses which otherwise were denied under the Founders' strict liability
approach. According to Comment j, though generally free from liability
without negligence, a manufacturer knowing that there exists some set of
consumers particularly susceptible is required to provide a warning reporting
the product's ingredients.
As the writings of Keeton and Wade make clear, however, the warning
requirement placed upon manufacturers was meant to be modest. And
Comment j closes with a paragraph that, in retrospect, emphasizes how
modest that burden was to have been, but that in the subsequent elaboration
of strict liability has been the source of a vast expansion in warning liability.
Comment j reads: "Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably
assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a
warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous."
In years subsequent to the adoption of Section 402A, this paragraph has
been interpreted by courts to eliminate the necessity on the part ofconsumers
to prove causation: that the absence of a product warning in fact caused the
injury suffered by the consumer.87 Its original meaning, however, is entirely
different. The writings of Keeton and Wade and Noel, from which the
warning requirement derived, show that, far from a source of expanded
liability, the paragraph was intended to constrain the manufacturer's warning
duties. The paragraph was meant to qualify the warning obligation to the
bare provision of the warning in some form. The intent of the paragraph was
to suggest that the manufacturer was not to be made liable if the consumer
failed to read the warning. Nor was it necessary for the manufacturer to
devise ways to ensure that the reader would see and appreciate the warning's
86. For a review of this case law, see Priest, Invention, supra note 19 at 523-525.
87. See, e.g., Phil/ips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
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contents. As long as a warning existed in some form, the manufacturer's
duties were discharged.
C. Strict Liability lRd Astray
As is well-known, neither strict products liability nor the extension of the
strict liability approach in other legal areas has followed the course the
Founders intended. Strict products liability has not been limited to
manufacturing defect cases. And the broader influence of the strict liability
idea extends far beyond the limited contexts ofdefensible automatic recovery
that the Founders envisioned.
As the Founders expected, the application of strict liability to
manufacturing defect cases signalled no revolution. Prosser had suggested
only one case of a hundred would be decided differently; of manufacturing
defect cases, he was probably accurate. It was very quickly perceived,
however, that the product defect problem was more complicated than
originally thought. Roger Traynor's 1965 article, discussed above, was
suggestive of some of the problems. 88 Although the principal point of the
article was the reaffirmation of strict liability for manufacturing defects,
Traynor probes the problem of dangerous design. He is clearly not prepared
to advocate strict liability in the design context, but he is uneasy with the lack
of an obvious analytical approach.
At roughly the same time, Ralph Nader began his attack on design
problems in American automobiles. In a 1965 article, Nader argued that
legal liability should serve as a deterrent against harm-causing manufacturer
design.89 It is an important index of the times, however, that the liability
Nader was recommending for these cases was negligence liability. Two years
later, however, Nader focussed his views. In a 1967 article with Joseph Page,
Nader strongly criticized the "deviation-from-the-norm" defect standard
that Justice Traynor had recommended in 1965, urging the application of
strict liability to design-related injuries.90
At about the same time, John Wade began to appreciate the product
design issue.91 Wade intitially insisted upon retaining the strict liability
88. Traynor, supra note 64.
89. Ralph Nader, "Automobile Design: Evidence Catching Up With the Law," 42 Den. L.
Center J. 32 (1965).
90. Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, "Automobile Design and the Judicial Process," 55 Calif.
L. Rev. 645 (1967).
91. Wade, "Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers," 19 Southwestern L.J. 5 (1965).
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standard for manufacturing defects alone.92 With respect to other forms of
defects, like design defects, Wade began to devise a way to apply the
negligence standard. Wade built from Sections 291-293 of the 1934
Restatement of Torts. These Sections had been the source of Learned
Hand's famous Carroll Towing decision in which Hand proposed a form of
cost-benefit analysis for the determination of negligence.93
Wade attempted to adapt the cost-benefit approach for the determination
of negligent product design. He proposed seven factors relevant to the
evaluation of a manufacturer's design negligence. Regrettably, Wade did not
follow the Restatement approach with much care. The Restatement Sections
had clearly indicated that the cost-benefit calculus was to be conducted
against alternative available actions that the defendant might have taken. If
Wade had appreciated this point, his cost-benefit test - which he deemed
"balancing the utility of the risk against the magnitude of the risk''94 - the
elements of his approach would have focussed closely on alternative designs
available to the manufacturer. Wade, more broadly, incorporated elements
that included the utility of the product as a whole against the product risk.
Some years later, he modified his risk-utility test to also incorporate
insurance considerations in what has now become the dominant standard
for evaluation of design defects.95
The efforts to define a sensible strict liability standard for the design-related
injury problem proved exceptionally difficult. Many courts, especially in the
early years following adoption of the Restatement, drew upon the references
in Comments g and i to consumer expectations of product dangers. The
consumer expectation language had been inserted in the Comments to
reinforce the contributory negligence-assumption of risk proposition of
Comment n: that the only manufacturer defense to strict liability (again,
given the expected manufacturing defect context) was the consumer's
voluntary decision to use the product though aware of the defect. Extended
as a standard of design defects, the consumer expectation language vastly
increased manufacturer liability, since it was a standard virtually without
92. Ibid.
93. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
94. Supra note 91 at 17.
95. John W. Wade, "On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,"44 Miss L.J. 825,
837-38 (1973). Wade's new set of factors continued to number seven, because he
combined two of the previous factors dealing with consumer awareness of injuries.
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content.96 Wade's risk-utility test also proved to lack specific content. The
various factors are redundant and suggestive that any fact related to the
product is relevant for resolution of the design question.
Except for manufacturing defect cases, then, the legacy of the Restatement
and its Comments was uncertainty. The Comments were read generally to
deny the relevance of manufacturer defenses. They were read to expand,
rather than to constrain, manufacturer liability for defective warnings. They
provided no definitive guidance as to sensible standards for design defects.
It was at this point that the broader intellectual currents of risk distribution
and cost internalization began to influence the direction ofthe law. As I have
shown elsewhere, the evolution of standards in both design and warning
cases has been strongly directed by the concepts of risk distribution and cost
internalization.97 The direction of this influence has been toward absolute
liability. The Founders stated with great emphasis that the strict liability
standard that they were proposing stopped far short of absolute liability.
Understood in context, I believe that the Founders meant what they said.
The Founders failed to understand, however, that the Restatement Section
and the Comments that they drafted were not sufficiently specific to constrain
the influence of the ideas of risk distribution and cost internalization that
had dominated the legal landscape for the preceding thirty years.
III. The Implications of the Restatement Experience
A. The Expansion of u.s. Liability and the European Parallel
The extraordinary expansion of civil liability in the United States has not
derived from the doctrinal adoption of the standard of-strict products
liability itself, but from acceptance of the premises underlying strict liability.
Although the Founders of strict liability had narrow objectives, their broader
justification ofstrict products liability dictated its expansion. Strict products
liability is based upon two central presuppositions.98 First, manufacturers or
other corporate injurers are in a better position than victims to prevent
96. The employment of the standard is described in Priest, "The Disappearance of the
Consumer from Modern Products Liability Law," in The Frontier of Research in the
Consumer Interest (1988) 771, and Priest, "Products Liability Law and the Accident
Rate," supra note 22 at 184.
97. Priest, Invention, supra note 19.
98. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., supra note 4.
HeinOnline -- 9 Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 118 1989
118 TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN LAW
injuries; thus, strict defendant liability will create incentives to reduce the
accident rate. Second, accidents that cannot be prevented can only be
insured against. It was believed that corporate injurers are also in a relatively
better position than victims to purchase insurance for unpreventable injuries.
Tort liability will provide victims a form of compensation insurance whose
premiums can be passed along in the product or service price.
Together, these two premises of strict liability account for almost all
important civil law decisions in the United States over the last two decades.
Not limited to the products field, these premises have come to influence all of
U.S. civil law and now serve as the interpretive basis even for responsibility
based on negligence.99 U.S. civil law is largely common law. The expansion
of civil liability since the mid-1960s has consisted of the aggregation of
thousands of individual judicial decisions based upon these premises, each
plausible in the context of the individual case, but with increasing cumulative
effect on U.S. product and service sectors.
To understand the current crisis in U.S. civil law, it is important to
recognize that these two premises lead inexorably toward absolute injurer
liability. The reason is clear. If it is accepted - as it must be - that the
principal effects of a legal rule are to create incentives to prevent accidents
and to provide insurance for accidents that cannot be prevented; and if it is
believed that manufacturers and other corporate defendants are always in
the better position both to prevent accidents and to insure for them; then it
follows that corporate defendants ought always to be liable. The expansion
of civil law toward absolute liability is a direct implication of the acceptance
of the premises of strict liability in a context in which the controlling legal
rule provides little guidance as to its interpretation.
There is an important implication of the U.S. experience for the future of
strict products liability in Europe and in Israel. The doctrinal formulations
of strict liability for defective products both in the Directive of the Council of
the European Communities and in the Israeli Defective Products (Liability)
Law 100 are as loose and open-ended as the original formulation in Section
402A of the U. S. Restatement. The European Directive provides in Article 6
that"A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a
person is entitled to expect... "101 The Israeli statute provides in Section 3 (a)
99. See Priest, supra note I.
I00. Supra note I.
10 I. Supra note I.
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that"A product is defective if (I) it is likely to cause personal damage owing
to a defect therein... "102
These definitions of "defect" provide even less guidance to judges than the
interpretive Comments to Section 402A. As described above,103 Section
402A initially proposed reference to consumer expectations for the definition
of when a product causing injury was to be regarded as defective. Over the
years, the consumer expectations test for a defective product has been
generally supplanted by the risk-utility test because court after court has
discovered the consumer expectations standard to be largely unhelpful. At
one extreme, since no consumer actually expects to be injured, the consumer
expectation test can stand for absolute manufacturer liability. Yet, if courts,
resistant to absolute liability, attempt to determine the content of consumer
expectations, in particular in cases involving complicated products, they
have found that consumers have no detailed expectations on which the court
might rely. 104
In this respect the European and Israeli definitions of defect are equally
unhelpful. The European standard refers not even to definable consumer
expectations, for which some evidence might be introduced, but rather to the
safety a person "is entitled to expect." The Israeli standard, almostcircularly,
defines a product as defective if it "is likely to cause personal damage." If in
an individual case, the standard is applied to the generic product, the court is
left with some judgment of that level of probability sufficient to generate
strict liability; on the other hand, if the standard is applied - as an American
court sensitive to the existence of manufacturing defects would apply it - to
the specific item used by the consumer, then the standard implies absolute
liability since the particular item that caused the damage generating the
lawsuit was surely "likely" to cause damage.
Like the Restatement in the U.S., both the European and Israeli standards
will require substantial interpretation by courts. What is the level of safety a
consumer is "entitled to expect''? How likely must an injury be for a product
to be regarded as defective? It is with these questions of interpretation that
the similarity of the U.S. and the European and Israeli positions becomes
102. More, supra note I.
103. See supra, text accompanying note 77.
104. For further discussion, see Priest, "The Disappearance ofthe Consumer From Modern
Products Liability Law" in The Frontier of Research in the Consumer Interest, supra
note 96 at 771.
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most clear. As in the United States, European and Israeli judges will be
compelled to determine the policies that lie beneath the strict liability
standard in order to make sense of the vague statutory prescriptions. If these
judges accept the underlying premises of U.S. strict liability - that
manufacturer liability will best control the accident rate and provide
compensation to victims - the U.S. civil law experience is likely to be
replicated.
B. The Counterrevolution of U. S. Civil Law
Within the past two years, there has occurred the beginnings of a counter-
revolution in civil law in the United States. Largely in response to the recent
crisis, and the resultant awareness that there are limits to the extent to which
a common law system can provide comprehensive accident insurance in all
areas of American life, both legislatures and courts have begun to roll back
the expansion of liability and to reconsider new premises on which to base
civil law.
As mentioned earlier, since 1985, legislatures of 39 of the 50 states have
enacted some version of "tort reform" legislation. 105 Most commonly, these
statutes are modest in ambition, though they are notable, at the least, as an
expression of legislative dissatisfaction with the judicial trend. Many statutes
provide specific immunities or standards of limited responsibility for
municipalities, non-profit organizations, boards of directors and other
groups particularly hard-hit by the crisis. Many statutes penalize frivolous
litigation and place limits on punitive damages. Some statutes, significantly,
place maxima on pain and suffering damages and abrogate the rule of joint
and several liability. In some instances, state courts have held these statutes
to violate state constitutional rights,106 although in most cases courts have
approved them. 107
There have been two recent developments, however, of extraordinary
significance to the counterrevolution in civil law. Within the last year, there
has been a major reorienta!ion ofcivil law in both New Jersey and California,
the two states which,prior to the recent crisis, had inspired and led the
expansion of liability among the various states.
105. This legislation is reviewed in Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 2.
106. See Smith v. Department of Insurance. 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
107. See. e.g.• Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137,695 P. 2d 665, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368 (1985) cert. denied. 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
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In 1987, the New Jersey legislature enacted a comprehensive products
liability statute which sharply alters manufacturer liability. New Jersey, of
course, had been a leader in the development of modern products liability
law from its earliest beginnings. It was the New Jersey Supreme Court in
1960, in the seminal case Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,108 that
definitively rejected principles ofcontract and warranty law for the resolution
of product defect cases. And in subsequent years, the New Jersey Supreme
Court continued this role ofjudicial leadership through influential decisions
such as Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine CO.,1°9 Beshada v. Johns-
Manvil/e,110 and O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., III all of which expanded the strict
liability concept.
The recent New Jersey products liability statute, however, terminates this
line of judicial development. The statute incorporates three important
doctrinal innovations. First, the statute introduces a substantially restricted
standard for design defects. The statute provides that a manufacturer is not
liable unless there was a "practical and technically feasible alternative design
that would have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the
reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product. "112
This provision appears similar to what has become known as the "state-of-
tbe-art defense," but it is different in important ways. The state-of-the-art
defense is a doctrine such as that in the 1985 Directive of the Council of the
European Communities, Article 7 (e), providing that the producer shall not
be liable if he proves "that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at
the time when he put the product into use was not such as to enable the
existence of the defect to be discovered. "113
108. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
109. 81 N.J. 150,406 A. 2d 140 (1979)(holding defendant liable under comparative negligence
despite plaintiffs contributory negligence). See also Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J.
402,298 A.2d 281 (1972) (holding manufacturer's design negligence to outweigh plaintiffs
contributory negligence).
110. 90 N.J. 191,447 A. 2d 539 (1982) (denying state-of-the-art defense in failure to warn case .
on deterrence and risk-spreading grounds).
Ill. 94 N.J. 169, 463 A. 2d 298 (1983) (holding product (four-foot deep pool) can be
unreasonably dangerous per se based on risk-utility analysis).
112. New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 2A: 58C-3.A. (I) (1987). The statute, however, also
provides an exception to this provision: where the product "is egregiously unsafe or
ultra-hazardous"; where the "ordinary user or consumer cannot reasonably be expected
to have knowledge of the product's risks, or the product poses a risk of serious injury to
persons other than the consumer"; and the product "has little or no usefulness." N.l.S.A.
2A: 58C-3.B. (1987).
113. But see Article 15.1. (B), which empowers member states to derogate this defense.
HeinOnline -- 9 Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 122 1989
122 TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN LAW
The difference between this defense and the New Jersey standard is that
the factual basis for the defense is knowledge while the factual basis for the
New Jersey standard is a practically feasible alternative design. In the United
States, "knowledge" has been imputed to manufacturers based upon simple
references or intimations in the scientific or technical literature. Courts have
not required that "knowledge" of potential harm represent clearly established
or accepted propositions, but rather simply notice that a particular harm or
effect may result from product use. In contrast, the requirement of the New
Jersey statute that the existence of a practically feasible alternative design be
established 114 is likely to substantially restrict manufacturer design liability.
The second innovation of the New Jersey products liability statute is a
rigorous stiffening of the requirements for establishing punitive damages. In
recent years in the United States, there have been great increases in punitive
damages awards. Almost all U.S. products liability claims filed today include
a punitive damages count, based upon the plaintiffs hope that a jury might
be incensed enough by the defendant's actions to award a large punitive
amount. The New Jersey statute now requires that the trial of the punitive
damages court be conducted separately from the trial on basic liability. This
provision will keep some evidence of a manufacturer's alleged indifference to
safety from influencing a jury's decision on basic liability. The statute also
provides that a plaintiff can only recover punitive damages if it is established
that the harm suffered resulted from the defendant's "actual malice" or
"wanton and willful disregard" of consumer safety, defining "actual malice"
as "intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil-minded act. "115
The third feature of the New Jersey statute is its enactment into law of
Comments i and k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A
exempting from liability harms that derive from an "inherent characteristic"
of a product known to an ordinary consumer, and harms caused by
"unavoidably unsafe" aspects of products. 1l6 Prior to the statute, the New
Jersey courts had not ruled clearly on the applicability ofthese exceptions to
strict products liability. The exceptions are of particular importance in a
114. Whether the plaintiff or defendant bears the burden of proof under the New Jersey
standard is quite unclear.
115. N.J.S.A. 2A: 58C-5 (1987).
116. N.J.S.A. 2A: 58C-3.A. (2) & (3) (1987). Note that the statute excepts from the "inherent
characteristic" rule industrial machinery and equipment whose dangers "can feasibly be
eliminated without impairing the usefulness of the product." N.J.S.A. 2A: 58C-3.A. (2)
(1987).
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growing number of suits against cigarette manufacturers,1l7 distillers, and
handgun manufacturers, and in continuous litigation against pharmaceuticals
with respect to the harmful side-effects of drugs. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers are insulated in many other ways by the statute which
establishes a presumption of adequacy of warnings approved by the V.S.
Food & Drug Administration (FDA)118 and precludes punitive damages
where drugs are FDA approved. I 19
The second development in the counterrevolution in V.S. civil law is even
more significant because it comes from the California Supreme Court, the
leading state appellate court in the V nited States. In a decision announced in
April 1988, the Court held that claims regarding defective products against
pharmaceutical manufacturers would henceforth be judged, not according
to a standard of strict liability, but according to negligence.
This is a decision of extraordinary importance. It represents a retreat from
strict products liability by a court, not a legislature. Legislative actions in the
V nited States embody the law, but they are often suspect as representing the
influence of political interests rather than defensible principle. Thus, the
New Jersey statute, while of significant impact, is attributed by many to the
political force of manufacturers and insurers, its principal proponents and
beneficiaries.
The decision by the California Supreme Court, in contrast, cannot have
been affected by such narrow political interests. More importantly, it is a
decision by the very judicial body that first initiated strict products liability
in 1963 in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods Inc. po and that (along with the
New Jersey Supreme Court) has most extensively developed the strict liability
concept. For example, the most widely accepted definition of the standard
for strict design defect liability is that announced by the California Supreme
Court in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co. 121 Similarly, the California Supreme
117. Indeed, a New Jersey federal court has recently ruled that the New Jersey statute
precludes suit against cigarette manufacturers on a design defect claim. The Court,
however, allowed the suit to continue on misrepresentation grounds, upon which the
plaintiff subsequently recovered a small damage award, the first against cigarette
manufacturers in the United States. Cippilone v. Liggett and Meyers, U.S. District
Court, New Jersey (1988).
118. N.J.S.A. 2A: 58C-4.
119. N.J.S.A.2A: 58C-5.C. (1987), un:Iess the drug manufacturer had withheld or
misrepresented information to the FDA.
120. Supra note 4.
121. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (two-pronged test:
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Court has been responsible for innovative extensions of strict products
liability, such as the market share doctrine in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories. 122
The recent decision of the Court, Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott
Laboratories), 123 resolves questions left open in Sindell. The underlying suit
is a class action involving claims by daughters of mothers who were given the
generic drug DES to prevent miscarriage. The class ofdaughters claims that
DES was defective because it caused them to suffer cervical cancers. In
Sindell, the California Supreme Court ruled that, in the context of a generic
product like DES, an injured victim need not identify the precise
manufacturing source of the drug causing the injury,124 but could recover
and apportion damages according to the manufacturers' respective market
shares. The issues in Brown involved whether, under market share liability,
the basic standard should be strict liability or negligence (there was
conflicting authority among the intermediate California appellate courts)
and also whether the doctrine ofjoint and several liability should be applied
to charge a single manufacturer with the entire judgmenL125
The Court ruled against the claimants on both issues. The Court held that
pharmaceutical manufacturers can only be held liable for defects of which
they had been aware or should have been aware, a standard it characterized
as equivalent to negligence. 126 And it held that charging manufacturers for
harms attributable to other producers under the doctrine ofjoint and several
liability was fundamentally unfair. 127
product defective if violates reasonable consumer expectations or if it fails risk-utility
test).
122. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P. 2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) (creating "market share" liability
against manufacturers of generic drugs), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
123. 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
124. The drug had been taken by the mothers of the claimants. Factual identification of the
source was extremely difficult, both because of the passage of time and because the
generic drug had often been packaged by pharmacists, so that the mothers themselves
had no information as to the precise manufacturer.
125. Supra note 2.
126. Note this is very similar to the state-of-the-art defense discussed above. The court
invoked Comment k of the Restatement (Second), Section 402A as the basis for the
standard. Note also that the court explicitly rejected the consumer expectations standard
of Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co. as inappropriate to prescription drug cases. 245 Cal. Rptr. at
419.
127. The Court explicitly recognized that this ruling places losses attributable to insolvent or
absent manufacturers on the injured parties, rather than on the negligent manufacturers
remaining in the case.
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The Court expressly constrained the application of its ruling to
prescription drugs. It is clear in its discussion of this point, however, that the
recent product and service withdrawals as a consequence ofthe U.S. liability
crisis had importantly influenced its approach. The Court was adopting the
negligence standard, it stated, "because of the public interest in the
development, availability and reasonable price of drugs... The possibility
that the cost of insurance and of defending against lawsuits will diminish the
availability and increase the price of pharmaceuticals," the Court added, "is
far from theoretical. "The Court listed several examples of specific drugs and
vaccines that had been withdrawn from product markets for liability reasons
in recent years According to the Court, these product withdrawals, "from
the public's standpoint are unfortunate consequences ... It is not
unreasonable to conclude that the imposition of a harsher test for liability
[than negligence] would not further the public interest in the development
and availability of these important products. "128
Pharmaceuticals are important products in any society. Because they
implicate health and longevity, their withdrawal from the market displays
the effect ofexpanding liability with special sharpness. But if, as accepted by
the California Supreme Court, the measure of the effectiveness of a liability
rule is its effect on consumer welfare, then one cannot distinguish in principle
the unavailability of pharmaceuticals from the unavailability of other
products that consumers believe will improve their lives.
The crisis in U.S. civil law since 1985 has witnessed the withdrawal for
liability reasons, not simply of pharmaceuticals, but of large numbers of
products and services. The ambition of strict products liability is to remove
from the market only those products that are excessively risky. But it is hard
to believe that, suddenly in 1986,47 percent of U.S. manufacturers discovered
products to be excessively risky.
The California Supreme Court in Brown and the New Jersey legislature in
its products liability statute have begun the reanalysis of the premises of
strict products liability. It will be important to observe whether Israel and
the European Community adopting strict products liability now, 25 years
after the United States, will accept the original premises of strict liability
which have led the U.S. into crisis, or will accept the counterrevolution.
128. 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418, 420-21.
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